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Abstract

ur aim in this paper is to argue that individuals join religious cults as persons, but lose their personhood as their position in the group is solidified, becoming simply humans. First,
we will outline what constitutes personhood and how persons
have a specific kind of value, or “dignity”, that renders them worthy of moral respect. This definition of personhood is drawn
from the work of Harry Frankfurt (1988) and Bennett Helm
(2017) and suggests that humans lack the positive freedom to
choose what to do, what to care about, and hence who to be. We
will then examine paradigmatic examples of religious cults to explicate how they purposefully recruit individuals who lack meaning in their lives, subject them to intense group experiences that
create major personality change, and consistently deliver absolute
truth claims that require uniform assent.
Additionally, we will examine how recruitment tactics
induce a sense of estrangement from the world in prospective cult
members, and why cult leaders shower their devotees with affection in order to acquire control. This will be explained in terms of
emotion regulation, drawing from both psychology and neuroscience. We will also establish that cults speak to a “broadly
Humean” understanding of the nature of practical reason. What
this means is that if a reason can motivate someone to act, it must
somehow also speak to existing desires or motivations.
Lastly, we will underscore how fear of social isolation and
information control is used to undermine the cult devotee’s capacity for “rational control”, as it prevents one from deliberately arriving at a practical judgement that is fully theirs. We will conclude that we ought to consider the implications of this project for
understanding moral responsibility, such that we can determine
how cult members willingly abdicate their capacity for agency.
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Personhood and Humanity
Recent philosophical work has argued that persons possess the capacity for rational self-reflection, thus enabling them to
think critically about the content of their thoughts (Frankfurt,
1988; Helm, 2017). This implies that persons possess the positive
freedom to choose what to do, what to care about, and hence
whom to be, rather than simply a “negative” freedom from constraint. It is in this sense that personhood is directly linked to autonomy, as we cannot delegate the formation of our identities to
external forces. Due to these capacities, persons are bound to
moral norms that render them worthy of “dignity” or “respect.” If
we accept this definition of personhood, it might seem that membership in a given community is irrelevant to understanding the
importance of moral norms, as personhood is defined in largely
individualistic terms. However, persons are held accountable to
moral norms through sanctions imposed by fellow members of
their community. This does not infringe upon their autonomy
because they willfully enter these communities in the absence of
coercion.
Nonetheless, one might ask, by what authority can others
impose sanctions? To answer this question, one must view membership in a community as how one acquires autonomy (Helm,
2017). This view proposes that being morally responsible to one
another is imperative to sociality itself. Still, an individualist definition of personhood creates tension between authority and responsibility. If others have the ability to shape one’s personhood
by virtue of sanctions and joint responsibility, then how can their
influence be anything other than a form of brainwashing? This
tension is what differentiates cults from normative groups, as cult
leaders do not recognize the authority of their devotees to also
demand compliance with the norms (Helm, 2015). To constitute
a legitimate claim over one’s personhood, responsibility and compliance must be two-sided. Furthermore, this points to a broader
claim raised by Robert Brandom (1979), in which he suggested
that freedom consists in rational constraint by self-imposed
norms. It should be emphasized that these norms are selfimposed because their influence is conditional upon agents endorsing them. Without this exercise of autonomy, these norms
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would have no claim upon a person and therefore no claim upon
how they hold others responsible.
Brandom’s understanding of freedom and rational constraint is also shaped by a Kantian theory regarding “concepts.”
What this means is that persons must actively apply the norms
they express rather than be forcefully compelled to employ them
in a systematic way (Brandom, 2007). Consequently, persons acquire the responsibility to both act in agreement with a given
norm and hold others accountable to following said norm. This is
a positive conception of freedom because it underscores one’s
power to take action, namely to use concepts to commit to the
norms they express. It is in this sense that behavior, not merely
intellectual commitment, determines membership status
(Brandom, 1979). In acknowledging this, it is important to highlight what Helm (2017) has called the “interpersonal rational
structure” inherent to normative communities of respect. This
implies that even if members hold different roles in a community
and thereby acquire different responsibilities, they are still bound
to the same communal norms. Without the bindingness of communal norms, personhood is lost.
Literature Gap and Paradigmatic Examples
The work of Bennett Helm (2017) has briefly posited that
there are humans, such as those with severe mental handicaps,
who are not persons. Similarly, it has suggested that there may be
non-human creatures, such as robots, who are persons. However,
it has not explored how specific communities, which we will call
communities of disrespect, can lead to a loss of personhood. It
has primarily identified normative groups, like sports teams and
clubs, to show how we are always bound to multiple communities
of respect simultaneously and why this matters for how we understand our place in the world (Helm, 2017). Additionally, the traditions or practices of said communities are not highlighted in
Helm’s work because these features are irrelevant to understanding their social structure. Our project will address this literature
gap by expressing how religious cults are non-normative groups
that thereby negate what it means to be a responsible agent. We
argue that communities of disrespect are groups which instigate a
loss of personhood by failing to implement an interpersonal ra-
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tional structure and consequently target individuals who are psychologically vulnerable. This suggests that the necessary conditions for personhood are undermined through affiliation with a
religious cult, leading to its eventual loss. To elucidate this claim,
we will examine three non-controversial historical examples of
religious cults: The Peoples Temple, the Unification Church, and
Children of God. Their history, traditions, and practices will be
explicated briefly, as this is central to understanding how they are
communities of disrespect.
The Peoples Temple was a new religious movement that
began in 1954 in Indianapolis, Indiana (Moore, 2000). The
church’s founder, Jim Jones, attracted a racially diverse flock due
to his messages of social equality and racial harmony. Consequently, the church opened nursing homes and free restaurants,
offered drug and alcohol counseling to addicts, and provided
clothing and employment services to the local community. While
the church originally espoused Christian ideologies, by the mid1960s Jones had swiftly discarded Christianity for belief in his
own psychic divinity. He then moved his flock to California and
began collaborating with politicians to lobby for liberal causes,
even going so far as to promote communism as the solution for
society’s ills. In 1977, after increasingly negative publicity, Jones
fled the United States for Jonestown, Guyana. Members who followed Jones were told that the United States wanted to destroy
them and that the only way to “protest the conditions of an inhumane world” was to collectively commit suicide (Jones, 1978).
Despite its tragic end, The Peoples Temple did not initially resemble a community of disrespect. Rather, Jones manipulated his
flock into losing personhood by gradually seizing their autonomy
until the norms they expressed were solely a product of coercion,
culminating in death. This tactic is made easier when members
already display psychological vulnerabilities prior to affiliation.
The second religious cult we will examine is the Unification Church, colloquially known as the “Moonies.” The church
began in 1954 in South Korea by the Reverend Sun Myung
Moon. As a teenager, Moon studied the Bible and allegedly had a
vision in which Jesus commanded him to establish God’s Kingdom on earth and bring peace to the world (Robbins, Anthony,
Doucas, & Curtis, 1976). In the 1940s, Moon began promoting
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this religious belief and was arrested by the North Korean government on the grounds that he was spying for South Korea. After
serving a five-year prison sentence, Moon returned to South Korea and established a formal religion. The result was a hybrid
movement that borrowed teachings from Confucius and Christianity. Most notably, Moon emphasized the importance of marriage and instituted mass wedding ceremonies. In 2012, after the
death of Moon, his youngest son established the Sanctuary
Church. The Sanctuary Church has adopted the teachings of the
“Moonies” and has encouraged members to bring semi-automatic
rifles to mass wedding ceremonies as a symbol for one’s ability to
protect their family. Similar to the Peoples Temple, the
“Moonies” did not originally operate like a community of disrespect, as Moon’s teachings were akin to mainstream religious institutions. However, by slowly encouraging his followers to view
“the family” and consequently Moon himself as their prime
source of value, his followers lost their personhood.
Lastly, we will use the Children of God movement as a
paradigmatic example of a religious cult. The Children of God
movement originated in 1968 as a group of runaway teenagers
and hippies who were encouraged by their leader, David Berg, to
devote themselves to Jesus and engage in promiscuous sex. The
group became known for their controversial method of evangelism, known as “flirty fishing.” The principle of flirty fishing is
that sex is the most successful way to secure converts and show
God’s love. Berg and his flock also believed that dead celebrities
and politicians, like Marilyn Monroe, Richard Nixon, and Winston Churchill, were their spirit helpers who imparted them with
vital knowledge. In recent years, the group has been subject to
legal investigation for pedophilia, which is a principle of the flirty
fishing method (David and Richardson, 1976). This group is
most emblematic of how members of religious cults lack the positive freedom to choose what to do, as they are frequently manipulated to engage in activities that they would not otherwise do in
the absence of coercion. If norms are developed through coercion
by external forces, then they are not self-imposed.
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Love-Bombing and Group Affiliation
At this point, it is fair to say that we categorize religious
groups as cults based on the degree to which the members relinquish their autonomy to a controlling and charismatic leader
(Halperin, 1982). The issue is then how these individuals come
to willingly lose their autonomy and ability for self-reflection. In
this section, we will argue that cult recruiters engage with prospective members in a manner that directly attacks the foundation
for individuality and personhood. By using emotion regulation to
shift normative reasoning based on genuine desires, to instead
goal-directed practical reasoning in persons, invokes a willingness to join the cult and indicates the moment that personhood is
lost and the agent becomes just human.
To be a person is to have the ability for critical selfreflection such that an agent can act based on its genuine desires
and intrinsic values (Helm, 2015). In this case, desires of this
type are reasons that motivate an agent to act in accordance with
what is worth living for. This type of reasoning differs from mere
goal-directed practical reasoning, insofar that it is not motivating
the agent to act in accordance for some particular end. Frankfurt
(1988) elaborates on this distinction when he refers to desires and
volitions; such that a desire is any reason to act and a volition is
an agent wanting the respective reason to be its will, or have the
ability to cause action. In the case of cults, the distinction is elaborated when members choose to join based on what they deem as
values integral to the type of life they find worthwhile and provides the preservation of self-identity. This differs from becoming a member for the purpose of preventing the loneliness and
stress that occasionally accompanies one’s life. This would be
acting based on genuine desires or a goal-directed end, respectively.
One might raise the issue that the distinction between acting based on genuine values and practical reasons is flawed; because genuine values could be reasons that cause the agent to act
to achieve some particular end (Brandom, 1979). A response to
elucidate the necessary distinction is elaborated through the reference of how we embrace our societal roles. One of the expected
roles of a professor is to publish academic work. The by-product
of providing this high-quality service involves a rise in prestige,
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as demonstrated by those who won the Nobel prize. Thus, in one
instance the agent could be motivated to act for the purpose of
achieving fame, or it could perceive its role as one involving the
enrichment and distribution of knowledge. In the first case, the
agent is acting based on rational goal-directed behavior. It wants
to publish more articles for the purpose of gaining fame. However, in the latter instance, the agent takes a more holistic approach
to its role and views all knowledge as valuable without putting
emphasis on just those impactful enough to win a Nobel prize.
An approach of this kind requires that the agent has intrinsic values motivating its actions, as indicated by the action not being
tied to some other end.
If what it means to be a person involves the capacity to act
based on genuine values, then this serves as a distinction between
persons and humans, which many argue only display rationally
goal-directed behavior (Helm, 2001). As such, prospective cult
members are initially persons, but as they progress through the
stages of recruitment they lose the objective quality of personhood until they become mere humans. Halperin (1982) indicated
that the primary recruitment strategy is love-bombing, which is a
technique that promotes the effusive and total approval of the prospective member’s behavior. We argue that this technique works
in conjunction with emotion regulation and as a form of social
reinforcement for the foot-in-the-door phenomenon.
Many commonly believe that the emotional state an agent
is experiencing can cause actions of a specific kind to the extent
that we can use behavior to efficiently judge what emotions the
agent is feeling under a specific context (Churchland, 1985). As
such, behavioral neuroscientists demonstrated that behaviors can
be reduced to neuronal activity to the extent that manipulating the
brain directly can give rise to the expected behaviors. Gobrogge
et al. (2017) showed that two neurotransmitters, vasopressin and
serotonin, modulate the aggressive and social behaviors in their
model organism, the prairie voles. These animals form naturally
occuring pair bonds with monogamous sexual partners, thus making them ideal to study the neural circuitry of pair bonding. The
amygdala and hypothalamus are brain regions known to modulate
emotions, and Gobrogge et al. (2017) recorded that significantly
more serotonin is concentrated in the posterior dorsal medial
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amygdala (MeAPD) and hypothalamus when the animals are naturally displaying social behaviors to their mate. In contrast, a significantly higher concentration of vasopressin was recorded in
this area when the animals were naturally displaying aggressive
behaviors towards other voles that were unaffiliated. The researchers also concluded that artificially raising the levels of serotonin or vasopressin can induce the animals to display social behavior to unaffiliated voles or attack their mate and offspring;
both behaviors that would not naturally occur. These results suggest that emotional states, whether naturally or artificially induced, can be reduced to brain states and cause predictable action.
If we take the reductionist argument from behavioral neuroscience as valid, then we can pose that cult recruiters are manipulating the neuronal biological circuitry in prospective members, such that they have no other choice but to join the group.
Much similar to the prairie voles having no other choice but to
attack their mate in the presence of high concentrations of vasopressin in the MeAPD. An agent can defend against this argument by indicating that this level of analysis implicates a stimulus
-response relationship that need not rely on personhood for the
behavior to be actuated. Insofar that the agent is acting against its
will or not caring to prefer one reason over the other to motivate
action, then personhood is by consequence already lost. This is
because the agent is not acting based on reasons (Helm, 2015;
Frankfurt, 1988). This argument is therefore not an attack on the
validity of our reasoning because the issue does not concern the
action of persons who have the freedom of the will.
Although the argument does not concern persons with the
respective freedoms and agency, if we take it as valid the reductionist argument does not hold with the neuroscientific evidence.
If we change the operationalization of emotional experience from
a behavioral response to shared experiences in correlation to brain
states, we still do not observe a direct correlation between brain
states and psychological states. By using the results from fMRI
studies, some have argued that across the brain there are specific
regions that are activated for religious experience, such as entering a trance (d’Aquili and Newberg, 1993). The limitations of
these results are that there is no current method to ensure that the
participants are paying attention to the relevant stimuli throughout
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the experiment. This ensures that the results are not skewed by
mind-wandering. Secondly, the results do not take into account
the subjectivity of human experiences, because although each
brain might be activated differently, the conclusion is an average
activation among all participants, thus reducing the validity of the
effects of subjective experiences in shaping behavior. Furthermore, multiple stimuli can produce the same neuronal patterning.
Insofar that this is happening independent of context, then we
have to view religious experiences as no different from nonreligious experiences (Cunningham, 2011). Contexts are essential for the interpretation of behavior and psychological states because in one instance I could be raising my right hand to ask a
question while in the other I am attempting to stretch or reach for
an object. Although the scenario involves the same behavior and
neuronal activity, a reductionist argument does not provide the
distinction and level of analysis as to how desires, reasons, and
emotional states can work together to motivate action and shape
intentionality (Davidson, 1963). The results providing support
for a reductionist account of emotions in driving actions do not
stand up to scrutiny and internal validity, thus a non-reductionist
holistic account is better since it handles much of the limitations
faced by a reductionist argument.
We argued that persons not only differ from mere humans
in that agents with personhood can act from genuine values and
have the freedom of will such that they can choose which reasons
to motivate action. As a consequence of arguing against a reductionist view of the emotions, we propose that love-bombing manipulates emotion regulation in a manner that affects reasoning
and agency; and is not identical to a stimulus-response interaction. The first step of the love-bombing technique involves the
cult recruiters showering the prospective members with a sense of
total approval and respect for them to have the belief that society’s laws and structures have disappointed and caused them to
feel alienated (Halperin, 1982). This sense of approval and respect for self-integrity causes the prospective members to have a
desire to be a part of the recruiter’s group because it provides a
sense of community where there is no restriction on agency and
personal values appear to be shared group values (Helm, 2001;
Halperin, 1982). This desire is a type of reason that accompanies
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the trust that the prospective member has toward the recruiter.
Trust, in this case, we take to be a reactive attitude that involves a
complementation of reasons and emotions driving the belief that
we can hold an agent accountable to act according to some norm
if they are to be a valid member of the group (Holton, 1994;
Helm, 2015). In this case, the prospective member is forming a
trust that he can fully express his identity in this religious cult;
which is guided by the belief that he will be accepted by other
members and the emotional desire to belong to a community.
Halperin (1982) suggests that as prospective members
make the decision to join a cult, they are welcomed and placed
through a type of ritual that engages them to commit to minor
acts, such as playing a game with constantly changing arbitrary
rules, to major events like sharing intimate details about their life
to the group. We argue that this method is no different than the
psychological effects of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon because both move from a small request to the agent forming a larger commitment to action. The effect is more pronounced when
there are social reinforcement methods employed, as suggested by
Crano and Sivacek’s (1982) results, where they concluded that
participants who received a positive reward in the initial induction
were more altruistic when engaging in future tasks, in contrast to
controls and those punished in the initial induction. In the case of
cults, the reinforcement for engaging in the small inductive tasks
is the fact that initiates have the strong desire to be members of
this community as a way of preventing the feeling of neglect and
isolation from the dominant society. The need for acceptance
goes to the extent that the agent can agree to larger inductive
tasks, such as engaging in promiscuous sex. Insofar that members are frequently engaged in activities that cause them to act not
based on their genuine desires, but instead on practical reasoning
to prevent some negative end, then it indicates the transitory period where the agent loses personhood and becomes simply human.
Once this transition is complete, the agent is now totally willing
to act in accordance with any group idea because they have a sole
desire for self-preservation and the cult provides that security.
Self-preservation, in this case, transcends the biological definition
to promote the persistence of life, for we are taking the term to
suggest a perseverance and commitment to beliefs, even if that
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means committing suicide in order to prove one’s loyalty to the
group. If this form of self-preservation was merely biological,
then members would not commit acts resulting in death. However, since this form of self-preservation is tied to group identity,
then members will do anything that this group identity requires.

Social Isolation and Information Control
Although love-bombing is a vital recruitment tactic, religious cults also speak to a “broadly Humean” understanding of
the nature of practical reason. What this means is that if a reason
can motivate someone to act, it must somehow also speak to existing desires or motivations. Given this understanding of practical reason and motivation, others have the ability to affect what is
rational for person X to do in so far as their values or motivations
are all a part of the world to which person X responds in acting
(Helm, 2017). An action cannot be conceived of as rational unless it conforms to one’s existing desires. Consequently, cult
leaders specifically look to individuals who are seeking meaning,
come from dysfunctional families, or are suffering severe psychological distress because they know they will respond to their absolute truth claims and promises of security. We can see this phenomenon when examining The Peoples Temple, as Jones specifically targeted impoverished communities, drug addicts, and the
homeless (Hall, 1987).
Past studies have provided support for this claim by finding that cult members report a high prevalence of psychiatric and
addictive disorders during the year preceding affiliation with a
group (Galanter, 1982; Spero, 1982; Rousselet, Duretete, Hardouin, & Grall-Bronnec, 2017). Additionally, Rousselet et al. (2017)
found that cult members frequently report life dissatisfaction as a
primary factor for joining the group. Similar to those afflicted
with addictive disorders, cult members report the existence of
problematic familial relationships, which render them vulnerable
to commitment (Repetti, Taylor, & Seeman, 2002; Buxant, Saroglou, Casalfiore, & Christians, 2007). If the family network is
a vulnerability factor, then this also suggests that it can become a
protective factor if family members promote leaving the cultic
group by speaking to existing desires or motivations. Nonetheless, for some individuals, cult membership can lead to a decrease
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in depressive disorders, as it can become a coping strategy
(Rousselet et al., 2017).
Religious cults also use fear of social isolation to motivate
members into remaining; thereby altering what is rational for
them to do. This process begins when cult members are forced to
sever ties with their original social environment, such that they
remain detached from outside influence (Rousselet et al., 2017).
Once the cult member is removed from their original social environment, they have nowhere to turn but to their charismatic leader, who will swiftly dismiss them if they fail to obey. When
Rousselet et al. (2017) interviewed former cult members regarding the factors that motivated them to stay in the group, they
found that one’s relationship with a cult leader and ultimately
one’s dependence on the group for identity formation was the
most cited factor. This form of manipulation may lead to the development of a dependent personality disorder (Burke and Permanente, 2006). It also induces anxiety in some cult members, as
they regularly fear being disassociated from other members.
They ultimately may fear rejection or abuse resulting from the
constraints imposed by the cult leader.
Additionally, Rousselet et al.’s (2017) study identified
that many cult members abandon their education or quit their jobs
at the request of their leader. This tactic is exemplified by the
“Moonies”, as Moon frequently recruited on college campuses,
while later encouraging students to drop out. Jim Jones also encouraged his followers to sell their homes and give all their wages
to the collective good of the Temple (Galanter, 1982). Without
the support of family, friends, and one’s career, many cult members find it difficult to consider departing the group even when
they no longer believe in its teachings. It is in this sense that they
have relinquished their personhood and become mere humans, for
they lack the freedom to choose what to do and who to be according to rationality.
Coupled with fear of social isolation is information control, which cult leaders use in order to prevent their devotees from
mentally confronting information that may motivate their departure. This undermines one’s capacity for “rational control”, as it
prevents one from deliberately arriving at a practical judgement
that is fully theirs (Helm, 2001). Furthermore, if cult members
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were free to view content denouncing the teachings of their
group, then perhaps they would be emboldened to leave or at least
possess the desire to leave. One may contest that even normative
groups, like mainstream religious institutions, are not happy when
their followers deliberately seek information criticizing the
group’s teachings. However, it is the possibility for retribution
that distinguishes cults from normative groups. Whether cult
members are emboldened to seek this information or merely
stumble upon it, the group’s leader punishes them accordingly.
Additionally, an interpersonal rational structure is not established since cult leaders do not recognize the authority of their
devotees to also demand compliance with the norms (Helm,
2017). For example, even though Jones’ followers sold their
homes and donated copious amounts of money to the collective
good of the Temple, he used these funds for lavish personal vacations (Lucky, 2017). If The Peoples Temple operated within an
interpersonal rational structure, where members and leaders are
subjected to the same communal norms, then Jones’ followers
would be able to demand that he also donate his money to the collective good of the Temple. Again, we can see this discrepancy
between cults and normative groups when examining the Children of God group. During an interview with BBC, a former
Children of God member expressed that there were severe consequences if someone asked questions or brought bad publicity to
the group by failing to appropriately answer outsiders questions
(Lucky, 2017). Nonetheless, the group’s leader brought negative
publicity to the group when he came under investigation for allegations of sexual abuse (Goodstein, 2005). One may contest to
this claim by pointing to examples of hypocrisy in mainstream
religious institutions. However, it is the level of hypocrisy and its
ability to work in consort with other manipulative factors that distinguishes cults from normative groups, thereby leading to a loss
of personhood. A mainstream religious group may resemble a
cult in some aspects but not others, or may weakly fit the definition we have posited in this paper. However, this does not definitively make it a cult.
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Synthesis and Implications for Moral Responsibility
This paper provides a framework in which personhood is
lost, by using the generally accepted notions of how genuine values and rationally goal-directed practical reasoning serves to distinguish persons from humans. We focused on how cult recruiters target a specific group of individuals that lack a sense of
meaning and acceptance in their life. The primary tactic used is
love-bombing, which subjugates the initiates to group activities
that dissolve the foundation of agency and decision-making by
following the same psychological principles implicated in the foot
-in-the-door phenomenon. We also argued that the structure of
cults, information control, and the need for self-preservation that
transcends the biological life all serve as factors that promote a
willingness to remain in the group.
In some cases, however, we argue that members want to
prevent the sense of social isolation, and so this is enough reason
to stay even if they are encouraged to act contrary to their intrinsic values. The issue then becomes who should be responsible for
the moral actions perpetrated by the group. In one case, we can
blame the leader for purposefully implicating the recruitment tactic based on some personal goal. However, we could also pose
the argument that prospective members joined the cult because of
their already existing desires to feel accepted in a community
where they can fully express their identity.
Henrich (2015) argues that humans have the drive to follow the command of those we deem to be prestigious because of
the evolutionary benefits it had in prolonging the life of our species. He continues to suggest that by siding with a prestigious
leader, our hunter-gatherer ancestors could more easily learn the
necessary actions needed to survive instead of using the slow process of trial and error learning. If we apply this definition of prestige to cult leaders, then we can see that members also perceive
the cult leader as an integral figure necessary for their survival
(Halperin, 1982). Furthermore, the results from Milgram’s
(1964) experiment suggests that participants are more willing to
act in accordance with someone they perceive as prestigious, even
if this means they must act against their reasons. In this experiment, a significant proportion of the participants were willing to
shock the other at a deadly voltage without questioning the com-
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mand from the researcher they perceived to know what is best. In
this case, we could conclude that members of a cult are not responsible for their morally repulsive actions because they are
brainwashed to behave accordingly by their leader.
If we accept that the leader’s commands are more influential than the group’s reasons to act, then we would be arguing
contrary to evidence suggesting that much of the cult’s structure
and behavior is maintained as a result of member dynamics instead of the leader’s commands. The results from Asch’s (1951)
experiment suggests that participants were more willing to side
with the majority of the group, even if the choice was contrary to
the agent’s perception and beliefs. In this experiment, the extent
to which social pressure from a majority could induce conformity
was assessed by having participants judge the length of multiple
lines. Results indicated that even though many participants knew
their responses were wrong, they sided with the majority to prevent a feeling of isolation. Halperin (1982) provides evidence
supporting the claim that much of the implementation of atrocious actions are done by members of the cult who are most loyal
to the leader. To some extent, this vindicates the leader from
much of the responsibility since he is not directly engaged in the
action. Insofar that cult members show their compliance and loyalty by signaling through action, then they should be responsible
for their choices because they are displaying loyalty to the group,
not directly to the charismatic leader.
If we accept that personhood is dependent on the agent
acting based on genuine values, then we can also propose a
framework in which personhood is lost independent of religious
cults. This will enable us to evaluate the process through which
persons can adopt goal-directed reasons that motivate action and
consequently how we can hold those agents morally responsible.
A particular example of this is Stockholm Syndrome, as it can
cause one to act contrary to their intrinsic values. Specifically,
Stockholm Syndrome is a psychological response in which hostages begin to identify with their captors ideas and beliefs as a
biological survival strategy (Alexander & Klein, 2009). The actions resulting from cult membership and agents suffering from
Stockholm Syndrome should be treated as a distinct but related
phenomena. They are similar in that personhood is lost because
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the agents are acting based on goal-directed reasons, but the process is different. In the case of Stockholm Syndrome, agents lose
their personhood and identity forcefully, normally through capture and torture techniques by an enemy force. By identifying
with their captor, their sole desire is to prolong survival. However, cult members willingly abdicate their agency and personhood
because of their need for acceptance and desire to preserve the
group’s ideas, which is amplified through love-bombing. It is in
this sense that cult members do not care if they die, as the idea
will prevail even if they die. Future researchers should focus on
the process leading to a loss of personhood, for this will dictate
how we should hold agents morally responsible for their actions.
We should also consider the implications of this project
for understanding how normative groups can quickly become
communities of disrespect when the leaders decide to implement
tactics that directly attack the foundation for agency based on
genuine values. This is reinforced by the susceptibility of prospective members, who can easily be subjugated to the group's
beliefs. To maintain communities of respect, we should ensure
that members and leaders are held equally accountable for their
actions and behave in accordance with self-imposed communal
norms. By failing to apply retribution, we would be encouraging
members that it is appropriate to accept a leader’s hypocritical
behavior toward their group, thus setting the precursors for relinquishing authority and promoting the dissolution of personhood.
Insofar that there is no mutual respect, then the bindingness of
norms is lost and members who choose to join and remain in the
group are acting contrary to the normativity of rationality. Thus,
they are acting contrary to what persons ought to do.
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